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PEEKING BEHIND THE 
PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS: 
MISSOURI V. FRYE & LAFLER V. COOPER 
Laurie L. Levenson* 
          In Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, the Supreme Court 
affirmed that plea bargaining, although controversial, has become a 
dominant feature of America’s criminal justice system and is here to 
stay. Both cases establish that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right 
to effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining. But neither 
delineates the minimum standards of attorney competence that will 
satisfy this newly identified right. This Article seeks to cure some of the 
uncertainty left in the opinions’ wake by proposing procedures for 
defense counsel, prosecutors, and courts that will safeguard a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. After exploring the history of plea 
bargaining in the United States, this Article turns to the two decisions, 
noting how the 5–4 split in each reflects the Court’s divided attitudes 
toward plea bargaining. This Article then outlines the basic 
responsibilities and best practices for defense lawyers, prosecutors, and 
judges as they relate to plea bargaining under Frye and Lafler. Finally, 
the Article concludes by arguing the right to a fair resolution of a 
case—the principal issue underlying both Frye and Lafler—must be 
protected not just by ensuring a fair plea bargaining process, but by 
reducing the total number of cases prosecuted.
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Public Defender David Case for his insights regarding the rough-and-tumble world of plea 
bargaining. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
There may not be a constitutional right to plea bargain, but for 
the first time the Supreme Court has recognized that there is a 
constitutional right to have effective assistance of counsel during the 
plea bargaining process. In Missouri v. Frye
1
 and Lafler v. Cooper,
2
 
the Court took more than a casual peek at plea bargaining. Writing 
for the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy decided to take a long, hard 
look at the realities of America’s plea bargaining process. 
Undoubtedly, what he saw was not pretty.
3
 
In America, “ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and 
ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty 
pleas.”
4
 Overwhelmingly, defendants do not have trials by their 
peers. They plead guilty precisely to evade the vagaries and costs of 
our trial system. Lawyers and defendants must make snap judgments 
about whether to accept plea bargains, even those that may involve 
the defendant’s spending significant time in prison.
5
 Plea agreements 
are made without full discovery having been provided
6
 and long 
 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
 2. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 3. Numerous articles have been written criticizing the plea bargaining process. See, e.g., 
Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652 (1981); 
Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979) [hereinafter 
Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History]; Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea 
Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense 
Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975); Albert W. Alschuler, The 
Prosecutor’s Role In Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968); H. Mitchell Caldwell, 
Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 63 (2011); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992). 
 4. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (citing DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl.5.22.2009, available at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “plea 
bargaining” as “[t]he process whereby the accused and the prosecutor in a criminal case work out 
a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1152 (6th ed. 1990). 
 5. A recent example of this dilemma is the case of Brian Banks, a Long Beach, California, 
football star who, on his lawyer’s advice, pleaded no contest to a rape charge rather than face the 
chance of a 40-years-to-life sentence. Greg Mellen, Brian Banks’ Fight for Innocence, LONG 
BEACH PRESS TELEGRAM, June 10, 2012, http://www.presstelegram.com/news/ci_20828491/ 
brian-banks. Despite assertions that he was innocent, Banks agreed to a plea deal that gave him 
up to six years in prison because a jury was being assembled to decide his case and he had too 
much to lose. Id. After he served his sentence, Banks was ultimately exonerated. Id. 
 6. In United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the 
prosecution is not required to disclose material impeachment information prior to the entry of a 
  
460 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:457 
before counsel has had time to conduct an exhaustive investigation of 
the case. Many plea bargains are made without the assistance of 
counsel.
7
 In reality, the plea bargaining process is a “best guess” 
about which resolution of the case will serve both sides’ interests. It 
is a system that is tolerated because, without it, our criminal justice 
system would be so overwhelmed that it would collapse.
8
 Plea 
bargaining is no longer an adjunct to the criminal justice system. It is 
the criminal justice system.
9
 
Although plea bargains are the lifeblood of the American 
criminal justice system, courts have been ambivalent toward them. 
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure bar federal judges from 
participating in plea bargaining.
10
 Even in those states where judges 
are allowed to participate in the plea bargaining process, their role is 
restricted. Judges must be vigilant not to coerce either side to accept 
a plea bargain.
11
 Generally, judges who do get involved in the plea 
bargaining process enter relatively late in the negotiations, as the 
parties seek to hammer out a final agreement. Meanwhile, 
prosecutors and defense counsel engage in a process that has been 
described as resembling horse trading.
12
 The focus is frequently on 
expeditiously resolving cases while defendants, especially those least 
educated and sophisticated, often get left in the fog.
13
 
 
guilty plea. Id. at 629–33. Moreover, it remains an open question whether the prosecution must 
disclose exculpatory materials prior to a guilty plea. Compare United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 
174, 178–79 (5th Cir. 2009) (guilty plea bars defendant from claiming violation of Brady 
discovery rules), with Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 293 (1st Cir. 2006) (government 
should disclose exculpatory materials prior to guilty plea). 
 7.  See Ronald F. Wright, Guilty Pleas and Submarkets, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 68 (2008) 
(noting that a surprisingly large number of defendants waive counsel, especially those charged 
with misdemeanors). 
 8. See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA 
BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003) (describing how plea bargaining came to favor in this country). 
However, there have also been criticisms of the case pressure theory for plea bargaining. See, e.g., 
Milton Heumann, A Note on Plea Bargaining and Case Pressure, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 515 
(1975). 
 9. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 
1912 (1992); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (“[T]he reality [is] that criminal 
justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”). 
 10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (“The court must not participate in [plea] discussions.”). 
 11. See People v. Jensen, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 201, 204–05 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); see also People 
v. Weaver, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 742, 756–57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that pressure from the trial 
court allowed defendant to withdraw his guilty plea). 
 12. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 9, at 1912. 
 13. Id. 
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In its 5–4 opinions in Frye and Lafler, the Court is trying to 
change that dynamic. Using the minimum standards for effective 
assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland v. Washington,
14
 the 
Justices once again turned to counsel to ensure that the plea 
bargaining system has some semblance of fairness. This standard, 
however, is less than a perfect fit for the plea bargaining process. 
In many ways, it is not surprising that the Court turned to 
defense counsel to safeguard the integrity of the criminal justice 
system. The Court has used this approach to supervise other 
vulnerable procedures in the criminal justice system that are 
traditionally conducted outside the presence of a judge.
15
 For 
example, even before Miranda v. Arizona,
16
 the Court sought to 
prevent coerced confessions by ensuring that defense counsel would 
have a crucial role in the process.
17
 Likewise, the Court has 
recognized the right to counsel to ensure that post-indictment lineups 
are not tainted.
18
 Because the Court does not have the power to order 
the prosecution to offer a plea bargain, the best it can do is ensure 
that the adversary system is fully engaged. 
The Supreme Court in Frye and Lafler has taken a first step 
toward addressing problems in the plea bargaining system. However, 
even this first step may prove to be complicated. What are the 
minimum standards for defense counsel in the plea bargaining 
 
 14. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 15. The Supreme Court has stated: 
The Framers of the Bill of Rights envisaged a broader role for counsel than under the 
practice then prevailing in England of merely advising his client in “matters of law,” 
and eschewing any responsibility for “matters of fact.” The constitutions in at least 11 
of the 13 States expressly or impliedly abolished this distinction. . . . In recognition of 
[the] realities of modern criminal prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee to apply to “critical” stages of the proceedings. . . . The plain 
wording of this guarantee thus encompasses counsel’s assistance whenever necessary 
to assure a meaningful “defence.” 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224–25 (1967) (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted). 
 16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 17. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
 18. Wade, 388 U.S. 218; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). Defense counsel can 
play an important role by ensuring that law enforcement officers do not use unduly suggestive 
lineups for witness identifications or having law enforcement officers suggest during the lineup 
proceedings, which suspect the witnesses should select. In this regard, the Supreme Court 
commented in Wade, “the influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably 
accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor—perhaps it is responsible 
for much more such errors than all other factors combined.” Wade, 388 U.S. at 228. However, 
“the presence of counsel itself can avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at 
trial . . . .” Id. at 236. 
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process? How much investigation must defense counsel do before 
recommending a plea? Must they always convey a plea offer to the 
defendant, even when the defendant has made clear he is not 
interested in an offer? Most importantly, in evaluating claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea bargaining process, will 
the courts become enmeshed in the plea bargaining process in a 
manner that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have resisted? 
Frye and Lafler establish that a defendant has the right to 
effective assistance during plea bargaining, but the Court did not 
firmly establish the minimum standards that will satisfy this right. 
This Article proposes procedures for defense counsel, prosecutors, 
and judges that will safeguard a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights.
19
 After Frye and Lafler, there is likely to be a surge in the 
number of ineffective assistance of counsel petitions filed by 
defendants claiming that they received inadequate counsel during the 
plea bargaining process.
20
 Setting standards will both help the courts 
in evaluating these claims and set guidelines for prosecutors and 
defense counsel participating in the plea bargaining process. 
 
 19. The Sixth Amendment provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 20. There is no problem with retroactivity in bringing a Frye/Lafler claim because the 
Supreme Court did not recognize a new procedural right, but merely applied the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, as defined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1994), to a 
specific factual context. The Eleventh Circuit has already held that Frye and Lafler did not 
announce new rules of constitutional law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). See In re 
Michael Perez, 682 F.3d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 2012). Moreover, the procedural posture and ruling 
in both Lafler and Frye eliminate any debate about whether it established a new constitutional 
right. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). The 
claims in those cases were raised on collateral attack and the Supreme Court in Lafler expressly 
held that the Michigan Court of Appeals had unreasonably applied the constitutional standards for 
effective assistance of counsel laid out in Strickland v. Washington, supra, and Hill v. Lockhart, 
474 U.S. 52 (1985). Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1390. Given the procedural posture of Frye and Lafler, 
the lower courts can anticipate a flood of petitions by defendants who claim that their Sixth 
Amendment rights were similarly violated and that they should now gain relief. This does not 
mean that all of these petitions will be successful. As set forth in detail in those cases, the burden 
will be on the defendant to show that his counsel performed below professional standards during 
plea bargaining and that the defendant was actually prejudiced by this conduct. See Frye, 132 S. 
Ct. 1399; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1376. However, the door will be open for petitioners to make such an 
attack. 
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Part II of this Article provides a brief history and overview of 
plea bargaining in America. Plea bargaining has existed since the 
1800s
21
 and has had a checkered history. Some states have tried to 
eliminate it, but it does not die easily. To understand how plea 
bargaining operates, one must know what its purpose has been and 
how it has functioned as part of the overall criminal justice system. 
Part III provides an overview of the split in the Justices’ 
decisions in Frye and Lafler. The Court’s decisions have rekindled a 
debate over the status of plea bargaining in our criminal justice 
system.
22
 Justice Kennedy may not be a fan of plea bargaining, but 
he is a realist. He operates from the premise that it is here to stay. 
Justice Antonin Scalia warns of the consequences of further 
legitimizing what he recognizes is, at best, a “necessary evil” of the 
criminal justice system. Both the majority and dissent recognize the 
unique challenges of having a court supervise the fluid and often 
unpredictable process of plea bargaining. 
Part IV suggests what basic responsibilities defense lawyers 
have during plea bargaining and the type of prejudice that is created 
when lawyers fail at those responsibilities. It also suggests how all 
the participants in the criminal justice system—prosecutors, defense 
lawyers, and judges—can create administrative checks to ensure that 
there is effective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining 
process. 
Finally, this article discusses more effective solutions to the 
overcrowding problem within the criminal justice system. The 
volume of cases going through plea bargaining is just a symptom of a 
deeper problem. The more significant problem is the trend in the last 
thirty years to criminalize and incarcerate individuals who could be 
managed through alternative processes. 
 
 21. Mark H. Haller, Plea Bargaining: The Nineteenth Century Context, 13 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 273, 273 (1978) (“[P]lea bargaining was probably nonexistent before 1800, began to appear 
during the early or mid-nineteenth century, and became institutionalized as a standard feature of 
American urban criminal courts in the last third of the nineteenth century.”). 
 22. See Jed S. Rakoff, Frye and Lafler: Bearers of Mixed Messages, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
25 (June 18, 2012), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1094.pdf; “Do Prosecutors 
Have Too Much Power?” Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes 
.com/roomfordebate/2012/08/19/do-prosecutors-have-too-much-power; Jack Escobar, Lafler v. 
Cooper, New Era of Sanity in Criminal Procedure, LAW J. FOR SOC. JUST. ARIZ. ST. (Mar. 28, 
2012), http://ljsj.wordpress.com/2012/03/28/lafler-v-cooper-new-era-of-sanity-in-criminal-
procedure/. 
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Frye and Lafler are important cases because they bring the Sixth 
Amendment into the twenty-first century. In this era of exploding 
case dockets, plea bargaining will be the resolution method for most 
cases. Yet, just because plea bargaining does not involve all of the 
procedures of a criminal trial, that does not mean that it requires less 
supervision by the courts. Even if there is no right to plea bargaining, 
there is a right to fair resolution of a case. In the end, the decisions in 
Frye and Lafler are as much about due process as they are about the 
right to counsel. 
II.  PLEA BARGAINING 
“Necessity never made a good bargain.”
23
 
 
At its essence, plea bargaining is a process of compromise. Both 
prosecutors and defense counsel make concessions in order to 
resolve a case. Prosecutors will allow the defendant to plead to lesser 
charges or face lower penalties so that they can resolve that case and 
move on to other matters. The defendant will accept the bargain to 
obtain finality and leniency. 
Both sides act out of necessity. Prosecutors realize they do not 
have the resources to try every case and that there are risks of failure 
should they try to do so. Moreover, trials are not just financially 
costly. They exact an emotional toll upon the participants, especially 
victims and their families. Most significantly, there is no guarantee 
that prosecutors will win their cases. Plea bargaining provides 
certainty that the defendant will be convicted of at least some 
criminal charge. 
Defendants act out of necessity because they can rarely take the 
risk that a jury will acquit them of the charges, even when they have 
a defense. The resulting penalties may be severe. Defendants rarely 
can risk facing a lifetime in prison by insisting on having a jury hear 
their cases. Defendants must also deal with the harsh reality that 
going to trial imposes enormous financial and emotional costs on 
them and their families. 
The result is a legal compromise. Plea bargaining, at its best, 
allows the criminal justice system to tailor an appropriate resolution 
 
 23. Benjamin Franklin, The Quotable Franklin, USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org 
/franklin/quotable/singlehtml.htm. 
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to a defendant’s case. At its worst, it jams an imperfect resolution 
down the throats of one or both sides of the agreement.
24
 
There are other key differences between the plea bargaining 
process and the trial process. A trial takes place in the open, is 
governed by rules of evidence, and is presided over by an impartial 
decision maker. Generally, there is a right to appeal a verdict from a 
trial. By contrast, plea bargaining occurs in the shadows of the 
criminal justice system—in the lockups, on the arraignment benches, 
over the cell phone. There are no formal rules governing how an 
offer must be presented or how long it must be held open. 
Personalities, conveniences, and local practice
25
 often drive the 
results. One of the most important factors is whether the prosecutor 
believes defense counsel will actually take a case to trial.
26
 The court 
has minimal involvement and, until Frye and Lafler were decided, 
there were few avenues for appellate relief. 
Over time, this informal resolution system has come to dominate 
the criminal justice system. It is underground justice that goes on the 
record once the tug-of-war is completed. To understand the impact of 
Frye and Lafler, one must appreciate the origins of plea bargaining in 
America and why it has become a pillar of our criminal justice 
system. 
A.  History of Plea Bargaining in America 
Although plea bargaining has dominated America’s criminal 
justice system for decades,
27
 it was not always such a dominant 
feature of the criminal courts.
28
 In early America, defendants often 
 
 24. Most frequently, the prosecution has the power to dictate the terms of a plea agreement. 
See FISHER, supra note 8, at 210. 
 25.  By its nature, plea bargaining is very localized. It is generally more difficult for out-of-
town lawyers to be as effective in the plea bargaining process because they do not have the same 
relationship with prosecutors, nor do they have the same understanding of local practices and 
resources, including options for probation. See Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 
MARQ. L. REV. 85 (2007). 
 26.  See generally Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests:  How 
Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 281 
(2011) (noting how disposition of cases depends in large extent on whether prosecutor believes 
she will have to take a case to trial). 
 27. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, supra note 3, at 19–24 (describing early 
origins of plea bargaining). 
 28. See Haller, supra note 21, at 273 (“[Alschuler and Friedman] agree that plea bargaining 
was probably nonexistent before 1800, began to appear during the early or mid-nineteenth 
century, and became institutionalized as a standard feature of American urban criminal courts in 
the last third of the nineteenth century.”). 
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represented themselves, and there was little occasion for prosecutors 
and defense lawyers to bargain over the outcome of a case. The 
victim and the defendant would face each other in court and resolve 
their case in our formal trial system. 
In fact, in the early Anglo-American courts of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, judges strongly discouraged plea bargaining 
and even guilty pleas.
29
 Because attorneys in court did not represent 
the parties, trials tended to end quickly, without messy 
complications.
30
 As a result, a plea bargaining system was not 
necessary to hasten the process and clear up court calendars. It was 
not uncommon for judges to discourage defendants from pleading 
guilty and urge them to proceed to trial instead.
31 
Apart from the lack of necessity for plea bargains, the courts 
were hesitant to accept them because of moral reasons. Courts were 
uncomfortable with the idea of an innocent defendant admitting to an 
offense that he or she did not commit, just for the sake of receiving a 
lower sentence. In addition, courts were concerned that offenders 
might be coerced into involuntarily confessing guilt out of fear or 
false hope.
32 
However, in the mid-nineteenth century, heavier caseloads led 
prosecutors to institute bargaining systems that would allow them to 
dispose of their cases without expending the resources necessitated 
by full trials.
33
 Plea bargaining was born of necessity; prosecutors 
 
 29. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, supra note 3, at 1, 5. As noted by one 
author, 
The history of plea bargaining in this country is filled with intellectual dishonesty 
stemming often from the belief that there was something dirty about allowing those 
accused of crimes to “cop a plea.” Common were the images of back door deals 
between lawyers and judges in which defendants often charged with horrible crimes 
pled guilty to far less serious crimes. 
Steven P. Grossman, An Honest Approach to Plea Bargaining, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 101, 
103–04 (2005). 
 30. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, supra note 3, at 8. 
 31. Id. at 9. For example, in 1804 in Massachusetts, there was a case about a black man who 
was accused of raping and killing a teenage white girl. After the defendant pleaded guilty, the 
court strongly advised him to let the government prove his guilt and informed him that he was not 
required to plead guilty. Despite the court’s urging, the defendant did not withdraw his plea and 
was sent back to prison to rethink his decision. However, when the defendant pleaded guilty 
again against the court’s pressures, he was remanded to prison, and it is only reported that the 
defendant “has since been executed.” Id. 
 32. Id. at 11. 
 33. FISHER, supra note 8, at 210. 
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could resolve more cases by shortcutting the litigation process. 
Begrudgingly, courts began to allow the process. 
Starting in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
courts largely welcomed plea bargaining as a swift and easy nontrial 
solution.
34
 Judges were particularly eager to use the mechanism to 
rid themselves of difficult decisions regarding capital punishment or 
other unpopular topics. Judges faced a boom of new civil cases born 
of the personal injury litigation that accompanied the Industrial 
Revolution.
35
 As judges became more preoccupied with the growing 
number of civil suits, they found they could devote less time and 
fewer court resources to criminal cases.
36
 Along with prosecutors, 
they had a growing need to structure a more efficient system for 
handling criminal cases. Judges quickly realized that they had more 
sway in determining the outcome and sentencing of a criminal case 
than ability to “coerce settlements in civil cases.”
37
 Judges could 
resolve their criminal cases with promises of lighter sentences
38
 and 
open up their dockets to civil cases. 
Once proposed, plea bargaining was quickly embraced by the 
courts. The statistics are startling. In 1845, 80 to 100 percent of all 
pleas from defendants were pleas of not guilty.
39
 However, by 1860, 
60 percent of all pleas were guilty and by 1879, 70 percent of all 
pleas were guilty.
40
 Courts were already beginning to see a slow 
decline in the number of jury trials as they were replaced by guilty 
pleas orchestrated outside of the courtroom and behind closed 
doors.
41
 Evidence of such plea bargaining in the late nineteenth 
century is very apparent. For example, in Alameda County, 
California, in 1880, Albert McKenzie was charged with 
embezzlement for pocketing $52.50, to which he pleaded not 
guilty.
42
 On the date of the trial, McKenzie, his lawyer, and the 
 
 34. John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 261, 270 (1979). 
 35. George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 867 (2000). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. MIKE MCCONVILLE & CHESTER L. MIRSKY, JURY TRIALS AND PLEA BARGAINING: A 
TRUE HISTORY 200 (2005). 
 40. Id. 
 41. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 251 
(1993). 
 42. Id. at 252. 
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district attorney met to let McKenzie withdraw his plea and instead 
plead guilty to a misdemeanor—embezzling an amount less than 
$50.00. The district attorney voiced his agreement and the deal 
became official.
43
 
There are countless examples of defendants changing their pleas 
from not guilty to guilty to a lesser charge, an obvious indication of 
the growing number of plea bargains that occurred during this era. In 
the same county, fourteen percent of all defendants “between 1880 
and 1910 changed their pleas from not guilty to guilty. Half of these 
pleaded guilty to a lesser charge, or fewer charges—unmistakably 
the sign of a deal.”
44
 Then again, this figure is not even wholly 
representative of the amount of plea bargaining that occurred. There 
was also a great deal of “implicit” bargaining where defendants 
pleaded guilty without an actual agreement in place in hopes that the 
state would “mitigate the penalty” for “saving the trouble and 
expense of a trial.”
45
 Overall, as court dockets filled, the court system 
resorted to a more efficient way of quickly resolving cases while 
expending minimal resources.
46
 
Today, plea bargaining is a well-established feature of the 
criminal justice system. In 1967, the American Bar Association 
(ABA) gave its blessing to the practice.
47
 In 1970, the Supreme 
Court rejected challenges to the constitutionality of plea 
bargaining.
48
 Most recently, the Sentencing Guidelines and tougher 
sentences have provided additional (and sometimes coercive) 
incentives for defendants to plea bargain.
49
 
Despite its problems, the plea bargaining system endures. 
However, to understand what protections the defendant needs during 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. For a discussion of the relationship between over-criminalization and plea bargaining, 
see Lucian E. Dervan, Overcriminalization 2.0: The Symbiotic Relationship Between Plea 
Bargaining and Overcriminalization, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 645 (2011). 
 47. ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty Part II, at 300 (Approved 
Draft 1968) (“[A] high proportion of pleas of guilty and nolo contendere does benefit the system. 
Such pleas tend to limit the trial process to deciding real disputes and, consequently, to reduce the 
need for funds and personnel.”). 
 48. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970). 
 49. FISHER, supra note 8, at 210 The Sentencing Guidelines invest in prosecutors the power 
to dictate many sentences through charging and plea bargaining decisions. Id. 
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the process, it is important to address the benefits and detriments of 
plea bargaining. 
B.  Pros and Cons of Plea Bargaining 
In the abstract, plea bargaining is neither an absolute good nor 
an absolute evil.
50
 In addition to allowing courts to process a high 
volume of cases, plea bargaining can also help both prosecutors and 
defense lawyers tailor the result of a case to better fit the actions of 
the defendant and the defendant’s background.
51
 
1.  Pros 
There are advantages to plea agreements from the perspective of 
all involved parties. From a societal point of view, plea bargaining is 
advantageous for the sake of sheer efficiency, as it helps alleviate 
already crowded court dockets.
52
 Because court dockets are already 
flush with cases, a quick and efficient way to resolve cases, such as 
plea bargaining, has its benefits in the criminal system. Judges no 
longer need to schedule and hold a trial because the case has already 
been resolved with a sentence decided for the defendant. 
From the view of prosecutors, a plea agreement guarantees a 
conviction without the risk of spending long hours and countless 
resources resulting in a loss.
53
 In addition, plea agreements lighten 
the prosecutor’s caseload. An enormous percentage of cases are 
already settled with plea bargaining, yet there are still many cases 
left to be tried. To imagine a prosecutor’s caseload without the tool 
of plea bargaining would be unfathomable. 
 
 50. This is true despite the fact that the origins of plea bargaining are linked by scholars to 
“fixers” and others who sought to corrupt the judicial process. See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining 
and Its History, supra note 3, for a description of how “political corruption apparently contributed 
to a flourishing practice of plea bargaining.” Id. at 23. 
 51. One example of how prosecutors and defense lawyers try to tailor sentences to the 
individual’s actions and background is the continued effort to evade the mandatory minimum 
sentence. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284 (1997). 
 52. Even before Frye and Lafler, the Supreme Court recognized the critical role of plea 
bargaining in the criminal justice system. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970); 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (“Disposition of charges after plea discussions 
is not only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons.”). 
 53. For a full discussion of incentives for prosecutors to plea bargain, see Stephanos Bibas, 
Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2470–76 (2004). 
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Lastly, the defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and 
the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial by obtaining a speedy 
disposition of his case. By plea bargaining, the defendant can quickly 
come to an agreement with the prosecutors, ensuring a particular 
result if he or she simply pleads guilty. The defendant is no longer at 
risk of the maximum sentence, and is instead given a lighter sentence 
with a less severe charge and the opportunity to quickly move 
forward with his or her life. And of course, because the case is 
resolved in such a timely manner, the defendant avoids the costs that 
come with having expensive legal representation. 
2.  Cons 
The most significant criticism of plea bargaining is that the 
process can force innocent defendants into pleading guilty.
54
 In order 
to escape the possibility of a harsher sentence, innocent defendants 
may plead guilty and accept a guaranteed lighter sentence.
55
 In this 
situation, the prosecutor has virtually limitless discretion and 
immense leverage to convince a defendant to agree to the bargain.
56
 
As a result, plea bargaining may prompt prosecutors to practice 
overcharging to intimidate defendants with the strictest sentence.
57
 
 
 54. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 58 (2011). 
 55. See id. 
 56. Prosecutors dominate the current plea bargaining process. They decide which charges 
will be filed, what deals will be offered, and which defendants will be prosecuted to the full 
extent of the law. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: 
Lessons from Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
165, 165 (2004) (quoting Justice Robert Jackson’s famous saying that a federal prosecutor has 
“more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America,” and Judge 
Gerald Lynch referring to federal prosecutors performing “the role of god”) (citations omitted); 
see also Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 20 (1998) (discussing how the decisions and actions of prosecutors have 
serious consequences and have a great impact on everyone in the criminal justice system). 
Many commentators believe “[s]uch unfettered discretion undermines fairness, regardless 
of whether or not prosecutors abuse this privilege.” Brandon J. Lester, Note, System Failure: The 
Case for Supplanting Negotiation with Mediation in Plea Bargaining, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 563, 572 (2005) (citing Davis, supra note 56, at 20–21; Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining 
in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1993)). The reality is that 
[i]n plea negotiations, criminal defendants must often choose between persistently 
asserting their innocence and gambling on the system on the one hand and admitting 
guilt to a lesser charge, thereby receiving an early release and avoiding the chance of a 
wrongful conviction to a serious crime or a harsh judicial sentence on the other. Many 
others suffer unconscionable offers from vengeful prosecutors . . . . 
Lester, supra note 56, at 564–65. 
 57. The adoption of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines added to federal prosecutors’ ability to 
pressure defendants into pleading guilty simply by filing extensive charges and literally daring 
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Even innocent defendants may be willing to plead guilty if they face 
the possibility of an unbearably long sentence, or in the worst-case 
scenario, death.
58
 
Another criticism of plea bargaining is that it bypasses the 
requirements for a thorough investigation and denies the defense any 
chance to argue its side.
59
 In a sense, it allows the prosecutor to 
become both the judge and jury. As long as the defendant is willing 
to accept the bargain, his guilt will be determined without full fact-
finding that conforms to the “rigorous standards of due process and 
proof imposed during trials.”
60
 Therefore, critics argue that plea 
bargaining undermines the values of the criminal justice system by 
leaving the fate of the case in the hands of a prosecutor.
61
 
The last criticism is that plea bargaining paints a picture to 
offenders that “the law is like a Turkish bazaar[]” where justice can 
simply be purchased and sold.
62
 Because it sends a message that 
defendants can evade punishment through negotiation, the biggest 
concern is that plea bargaining weakens the goal of deterrence in 
criminal punishment.
63
 Furthermore, there are great disparities 
 
defendants to take those charges to trial. Because of the sentencing disparity between those 
defendants who plead guilty and those convicted after trial, defendants may be pressured by 
charges alone to agree to a plea bargain. As Chief Judge William G. Young of the U.S. District 
Court for Massachusetts phrased it, “Evidence of sentencing disparity visited on those who 
exercise their Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury is today stark, brutal, and 
incontrovertible. . . . [U]nder the Sentencing Guidelines regime with its vast shift of power to the 
Executive, that disparity has widened to an incredible 500 percent.” Andrew E. Taslitz, 
Prosecutorial Preconditions to Plea Negotiations: “Voluntary” Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 
CRIM. JUST., Fall 2008, at 14, 20. 
 58. See Abraham S. Goldstein, Converging Criminal Justice Systems: Guilty Pleas and the 
Public Interest, 49 SMU L. REV. 567, 571 (1996) (“Even innocent defendants may be willing to 
abandon their defenses if the stakes are high enough and the probabilities of conviction are great 
enough.”); C. Ronald Huff, Wrongful Conviction: Causes and Public Policy Issues, CRIM. JUST., 
Spring 2003, at 15, 17 (“[M]any defendants can be enticed to plead guilty, even though they are 
innocent, in order to avoid even more severe consequences of systematic error.”). 
 59. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Wake-Up Call from the Plea-Bargaining Trenches, 19 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 135, 137 (1994) (“[P]lea bargains are often struck on the basis of incomplete, 
highly imperfect information and little more than the attorney’s guess about what a trial might 
reveal if one were held.”). 
 60. Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment, Should We Really “Ban” Plea Bargaining?: The 
Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 769 (1998). Although this 
criticism has some merit, others argue that it is exaggerated. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 770 (quoting John Kaplan, American Merchandising and the Guilty Plea: 
Replacing the Bazaar with the Department Store, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215, 218 (1977)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 63. Id. at 771. 
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between the sentences of those who accept pleas and those who do 
not, even though they have been charged with similar crimes. Critics 
worry that this leads offenders to believe that they can “get away” 
with lenient sentences as long as they engage in bargaining.
64 
C.  Approaches of Other Countries 
Other countries use plea bargaining, but not necessarily in the 
same manner as the United States. In fact, the virtues and liabilities 
of plea bargaining vary greatly depending on its role in the overall 
justice system. In an accusatory system, such as that in the United 
States, plea bargaining mostly occurs between the parties; the court 
enters into the process, if at all, after the bargaining has run its 
course. The court does not ordinarily have a hand in what is 
communicated between the parties, nor in what is communicated by 
defense counsel to the defendant. By contrast, in other judicial 
systems, the judge may play a more prominent role in plea 
bargaining and how it will affect the outcome of a case. 
For example, in Germany, unlike the United States, plea 
bargaining involves not only the defense attorney and the prosecutor, 
but also the judge, who acts as both a party to and a supervisor of 
plea negotiations; this ensures that plea bargains are fair and 
consistent with the true facts of the case.
65
 The primary duty of a 
judge in the German judicial system is to uncover the “substantive 
truth” of the case.
66
 Because of this responsibility, judges are 
included in the plea bargaining process. Their duty is to discover the 
truth of the case, rather than simply resolving it. In the German 
system, a judge will refuse to accept a guilty plea from the defendant 
if the defendant still claims innocence, so it is the duty of the court to 
discover the facts of the case and determine fault.
67
 
The German approach offers certain advantages over the 
American system. First, in America, if an agreement was made 
solely between the defense attorney and the prosecutor, then there is 
no guarantee that the court will accept the agreement and sentence 
 
 64. See JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT’S 
PERSPECTIVE 77–92 (1972). 
 65. Jenia I. Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 
AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 214–15 (2006). 
 66. Id. at 215. 
 67. JENIA I. TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS 113 (2009). 
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the defendant as agreed upon.
68
 However, with court involvement, 
“judges are actively involved, openly discussing the merits of the 
case and the range of acceptable dispositions.”
69
 On the other hand, 
because the German judges are involved in plea negotiations, there is 
the risk that judges will put too much pressure on defendants to 
accept deals.
70
 
Russia also uses a form of plea bargaining. The Russian 
Criminal Procedure Code lays out a “special trial procedure” where 
the defendant makes a motion “to accede to the charges, waive 
ordinary trial procedures, and accept punishment.”
71
 Although the 
Code does not explicitly mention negotiations, they are likely to 
occur between the prosecution and defense in the form of “a 
prosecutorial promise to recommend a lenient sentence and the 
defendant’s promise to admit guilt and to cooperate with the 
prosecution in other cases.”
72
 However, it is unlikely for “charge 
bargaining” to occur because of the Russian “principle of mandatory 
prosecution and the lack of broad prosecutorial charging 
discretion.”
73
 
Russian procedures present a form of guilty plea “in which the 
accused expresses his or her ‘agreement with the charges.’ If this 
plea is accepted (the public prosecutor and the victim have a veto, 
which thus opens the door for plea bargaining), the judge may 
sentence the accused to no more than two-thirds of the maximum 
term.”
74
 In other words, the Russian plea bargaining system is 
comparable to that of the United States, in that a defendant who 
agrees to plead guilty and accept a lighter sentence is essentially 
rewarded with a lighter sentence for saving the court valuable time 
and resources. Moreover, in the negotiations between prosecutors 
and defense, both sides clearly make agreements and promises so 
long as the defendant pleads guilty. 
Whereas the Anglo-American system employs a formal plea 
bargaining system, Japan has adopted informal alternatives in 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 117. 
 71. Id. at 143. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Stephen C. Thaman, Russia, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 414, 
418 (Kevin Jon Heller & Markus D. Dubber eds., 2011). 
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response to the need to accelerate criminal proceedings in its justice 
system.
75
 As a nation that culturally values truthful explanations and 
genuine repentance from defendants, Japan, through its Justice 
System Reform Council, explicitly rejected the institutionalization of 
plea bargaining.
76
 However, shifting trends called for changes in 
Japan’s policies. Although Japan once was recognized as a country 
that boasted steadily low crime rates, it experienced a massive 
upsurge in crime rate at the turn of the twenty-first century.
77
 In 
addition, its “prosecutors’ offices remain ‘chronically 
understaffed.’”
78
 Because this led to more cases and overcrowded 
courts, there was a growing use of “tacit” bargaining to alleviate the 
problem.
79
 
There are three main types of “tacit” plea bargaining tactics used 
in Japan. First is a summary proceeding, which lacks a formal trial 
and may be requested by the prosecutor for very minor criminal 
cases.
80
 Here, once the defendant confesses, he will be charged with 
a monetary fine up to approximately ¥500,000 ($4,500.00) instead of 
a sentence.
81
 Second is a discretionary prosecution, in which the 
prosecutor suspends the prosecution or offers a lower sentence if the 
defendant “acknowledges guilt, asks for pardon, and appears willing 
to make some restitution to the victim.”
82
 Third is unofficial 
cooperation and exchange with the court.
83
 As long as the defendant 
shows remorse and confesses his crime, the court will most likely 
give him a lenient sentence for doing so.
84
 
One criticism of the Japanese structure is that the current system 
of plea bargaining is unregulated and can be abused by the 
prosecution.
85
 For example, because there are no formal enforcement 
mechanisms for these tacit bargains, the prosecutor may change his 
 
 75. TURNER, supra note 67, at 172. 
 76. Priyanka Prakash, To Plea or Not to Plea: The Benefits of Establishing an 
Institutionalized Plea Bargaining System in Japan, 20 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 607, 608–09 
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 77. Id. at 612. 
 78. Id. (citation omitted). 
 79. TURNER, supra note 67, at 176. 
 80. Id. at 186. 
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 85. Prakash, supra note 76, at 618. 
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or her mind or fail to keep a promise without any consequences.
86
 
Moreover, Japan’s criminal justice system aims to achieve “just 
results,” even at the expense of just procedures.
87
 This may lead to 
coercion, intimidating interrogation methods, and involuntary 
confessions, ultimately yielding potential abuse of defendants’ 
rights.
88
 With these potential abuses in mind, Japan’s leaders struggle 
to find a way to balance efficiency and justice when developing the 
country’s mechanisms for plea bargaining.
89
 
Like the United States and Germany, China has widely 
employed plea bargaining as a response to increasing crime rates and 
increasing caseloads in the courts.
90
 Unlike the United States and 
Germany, however, China did not discourage or avoid the use of plea 
bargaining from the early stages of its legal system’s development.
91
 
In fact, plea bargaining is particularly suitable and welcomed in a 
country that stands by a policy of leniency to those who confess, and 
harshness to those who resist (tanbai congkuang kangju congyuan).
92 
There are two types of plea bargaining in China: one is called 
the “Summary Procedure,” where the punishment is less than or 
equal to three years, and the other is called the “Simplified 
Procedure,” for sentences of more than three years.
93
 Under the 
Summary Procedure, the defendant, the prosecutor, and the judge 
must all consent to its use. It is similar to the guilty plea in the United 
States because it summarily presents the facts of the case.
94
 
However, it differs from the American system because there is still a 
trial, and the judge is the principal decision-maker who wields the 
most power. The Simplified Procedure is similar to the Summary 
Procedure, but it requires a panel of three judges, and the prosecutor 
must appear in court.
95
 It differs from the American guilty plea 
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because the prosecutor and the defense cannot bargain for a specified 
sentence term, but must instead yield to the discretion of the court.
96 
Some critics of Chinese plea bargaining note that justice and 
fairness are becoming less relevant, as faster trials and sentences are 
becoming the primary goals.
97
 For instance, defendants are making 
quick decisions about taking the plea without being properly 
informed about the repercussions or about their alternatives.
98
 In 
addition, the Chinese government is still in the process of combating 
rampant corruption, so critics are skeptical as to whether fair trials 
can be carried out. To develop a system that retains both efficiency 
and integrity, greater openness and a more detailed explanation of 
the procedure to the defendant is needed.
99 
D.  Rethinking America’s 
Plea Bargaining System 
America has also been struggling with how to modify its plea 
bargaining system to ensure that proceedings are both expeditious 
and fair. The same concerns that affect other countries, including the 
accuracy of guilty pleas, have affected the American criminal justice 
system. Until recently, the Supreme Court left the mechanics of plea 
bargaining to the parties and the lower courts. However, last year 
was a turning point. For the first time, the Supreme Court attempted 
to set constitutional standards for a process that it had previously 
held was not justified as a constitutional right. 
III.  2012: TACKLING PLEA BARGAINING 
MISSOURI V. FRYE & LAFLER V. COOPER 
In the 2011–2012 term, the Supreme Court jumped into the plea 
bargaining debate by deciding two cases—Missouri v. Frye and 
Lafler v. Cooper. Each case involved the issue of whether there was 
ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process. 
Each unveiled a troublesome aspect of the plea bargaining process. 
 
 96. TURNER, supra note 67, at 200. 
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 99. Id. 
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A.  Missouri v. Frye: 
“Thou Shalt Communicate With Your Client!” 
In Missouri v. Frye,
100
 Galin Frye was charged with driving with 
a revoked license. Because this was his fourth violation, he was 
charged under Missouri law with a felony that carried a maximum 
four-year prison term. The prosecutor sent Frye’s lawyer a letter 
offering to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor and to recommend a 
ninety-day sentence if Frye would plead guilty. Frye’s lawyer never 
conveyed the offer to Frye and the offer expired. Then, right before 
Frye’s preliminary hearing, he was arrested again for the same 
offense. Frye ended up pleading guilty with no underlying plea 
agreement and was sentenced to three years in prison. 
On petition for habeas corpus, Frye claimed that his Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated 
because his counsel failed to inform him of the prosecution’s plea 
offer, which he claimed he would have accepted, had he known 
about it.
101
 The first hurdle Frye had to overcome in making his 
claim was to convince the Court that he had a right to effective 
assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage—a right the 
Supreme Court has never recognized. Yet, the majority in Frye had 
little trouble recognizing plea bargaining as a “critical stage” at 
which the Sixth Amendment guaranteed the defendant the right to 
counsel.
102
 
Extrapolating from the Court’s opinion in Hill v. Lockhart,
103
 
and its more recent decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,
104
 Justice 
Kennedy wrote that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed Frye the right 
to effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining. Neither Hill 
nor Padilla was directly on point because each focused more on 
whether counsel’s wrong advice negated the client’s guilty pleas than 
the implications of counsel’s failure to inform the client of a plea 
offer. In Hill, the defense counsel misinformed the defendant of the 
amount of time he would have to serve before he became eligible for 
parole.
105
 In Padilla, the Court set aside a plea because the defense 
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counsel misinformed the defendant of the immigration consequences 
of the conviction.
106
 Yet, the language from these cases became 
critical to the task of finding a general duty of effective assistance of 
counsel in plea bargaining. In particular, Justice Kennedy focused on 
the Court’s statement in Padilla that “the negotiation of a plea 
bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.”
107
 
Although Justice Kennedy recognized that there is a difference 
between invalidating a plea based on counsel’s bad advice and the 
situation in Frye, where the challenge was to the defense counsel’s 
conduct during plea bargaining before the plea proceedings, he found 
that the differences were not constitutionally significant.
108
 More 
importantly, he was persuaded that the “simple reality”
109
 of our 
criminal justice system made it imperative for the Court to include 
counsel’s conduct during plea bargaining within the Sixth 
Amendment’s umbrella. As he noted, 97 percent of federal 
convictions and 94 percent of state convictions are the result of 
guilty pleas.
110
 
The reality is that plea bargains have become so central to 
the administration of the criminal justice system that 
defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain 
process, responsibilities that must be met to render the 
adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment 
requires in the criminal process at critical stages.
111
 
Yet, recognizing the right to effective assistance of counsel 
during plea bargaining was only the first step in the Court’s analysis. 
The more challenging task was to define what standards should be 
used in measuring whether counsel has met Sixth Amendment 
requirements. Pursuant to the ineffective assistance of counsel 
standard set forth in Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate that 
counsel’s representation fell below professional standards.
112
 While 
it may not be possible to identify exact standards for how counsel 
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should act during plea bargaining, the minimum requirements are not 
that difficult to identify. 
The most basic requirement is that a lawyer must actually 
communicate the terms of a formal plea offer to the client. Especially 
when there is an offer with an expiration date, the defense counsel 
must let the client consider the offer before it expires. This is not a 
new concept. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice and many 
states’ professional standards require counsel to promptly 
communicate and explain plea offers to a client.
113
 
The second step of the Strickland analysis, as applied to plea 
bargaining, is a little more challenging: How does a defendant show 
that counsel’s ineffective assistance during plea bargaining 
prejudiced the defendant’s case?
114
 Here, the Court held that in order 
to establish prejudice, Frye would have to show “a reasonable 
probability that the end result of the criminal process would have 
been more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a 
sentence of less prison time.”
115
 If it is an offer that could be 
withdrawn by the prosecution or rejected by the court, such as the 
one in Frye, then the defendant must show that the offer would have 
remained and that he would have received the benefit of the plea 
bargain. 
Despite the many “ifs” in the Court’s standard, the majority felt 
confident that these issues could be resolved on remand. In fact, the 
Court suggested that Frye might not be able to meet the standard, 
given that he picked up a new offense for driving without a license 
shortly before his plea. This quite likely might have led the 
prosecution to withdraw its offer or led the trial court to reject it.
116
 
Nonetheless, Frye should have an opportunity to demonstrate 
whether his case had been prejudiced. 
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the four dissenters, who 
objected to the majority’s decision on the most basic level. As the 
dissent states, “The plea-bargaining process is a subject worthy of 
regulation, since it is the means by which most criminal convictions 
are obtained. It happens not to be, however, a subject covered by the 
Sixth Amendment, which is concerned not with the fairness of 
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bargaining but with the fairness of conviction.”
117
 Frye never argued 
that he was not guilty of the offense to which he pleaded guilty. His 
conviction was fair, even though he might have hoped for a more 
favorable resolution of the case. 
B.  Lafler v. Cooper: 
“Thou Shalt Give Your Client Accurate Information 
in Deciding Whether to Accept a Plea Bargain” 
In the companion case of Lafler v. Cooper, Justice Kennedy 
again wrote for the majority. While this was another case involving 
plea bargaining, the misstep by the defense counsel was different. 
Anthony Cooper was charged with assault with the intent to murder, 
possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of a firearm in 
commission of a felony, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and 
being a habitual offender.
118
 Evidently, Cooper, a convicted felon, 
had pointed a gun and shot at his victim’s head.
119
 The shot missed 
and the victim ran.
120
 Cooper shot again and hit her in the buttocks, 
hip, and abdomen.
121
 She survived the shots.
122
 
Prosecutors twice offered to dismiss two of the charges and 
recommend a sentence of 51 to 85 months for the other charges.
123
 
The defendant admitted his guilt in communications with the court 
and expressed a willingness to accept the offer.
124
 However, he 
changed his mind when his lawyer convinced him that the 
prosecution would be unable to establish his intent to murder the 
victim because she had been shot below the waist.
125
 Cooper ended 
up going to trial and rejected yet another plea offer on the first day of 
trial.
126
 The defendant was convicted by a jury and received a 
mandatory minimum sentence of 185 to 360 months’ 
imprisonment,
127
 more than three times what he would have received 
if he had accepted the prosecution’s initial plea offer. 
 
 117. Id. at 1413–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 118. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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Using the analytic structure established in Frye and Strickland, 
the Court held that counsel’s advice constituted ineffective assistance 
of counsel.
128
 First, the parties conceded that the counsel’s 
performance was deficient.
129
 No competent counsel would have 
believed that Cooper could not be found to have had the intent to 
murder simply because his shots had hit the victim below the waist. 
Second, the Court held that but for the counsel’s deficient 
performance, there was a reasonable probability that Cooper and the 
trial court would have accepted the guilty plea.
130
 Cooper’s letters to 
the court and testimony at a postconviction hearing established that 
fact. 
The real issue was what the remedy should be. How could 
Cooper be made whole at this point? The Supreme Court held that 
the proper remedy was to order the State to reoffer the plea 
agreement.
131
 
While raising issues similar to those in Frye, Lafler added 
another dimension to the Court’s decision to recognize a right to 
effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining. Cooper’s case 
was not like Hill, in which the Court held that improper advice by 
counsel could invalidate a guilty plea. Cooper went to trial and did 
not argue that he received an unfair trial. Rather, he relied on a yet-
to-be-recognized right to effective assistance of counsel during plea 
bargaining. 
In the end, the Court found the distinction to be without a 
difference. The defendant’s fair trial did not wipe clean his lawyer’s 
deficiencies. With plea bargaining being such a critical aspect of the 
criminal justice system, saying that a fair trial makes up for any 
deficiencies in counsel’s conduct during the pretrial process ignores 
the reality of the substantial effect plea bargaining can have on a 
defendant’s future. 
The dissent was even more vociferous in Cooper than it had 
been in Frye. Writing for the dissenters, Justice Scalia lamented the 
creation of a “whole new field of constitutionalized criminal 
procedure: plea-bargaining law.”
132
 For the dissenters, a defendant’s 
 
 128. Id. at 1390–91. 
 129. Id. at 1391. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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constitutional rights are about whether he or she received a full and 
fair trial. Since Cooper received such a trial, he had no constitutional 
right to a plea bargain. Moreover, the Court’s remedy that the 
prosecution should reoffer its original plea offer constituted undue 
interference with the criminal justice process. Plea bargaining may 
be in great use in the United States, but it is at best “a necessary evil” 
and an “embarrassing adjunct” to our criminal justice system.
133
 By 
recognizing the right to effective assistance of counsel at plea 
bargaining, the Court had shifted to making plea bargaining “the 
criminal justice system.”
134
 
In his trademark style, Justice Scalia wrote: 
The Court today embraces the sporting-chance theory of 
criminal law, in which the State functions like a 
conscientious casino-operator, giving each player a fair 
chance to beat the house, that is, to serve less time than the 
law says he deserves. And when a player is excluded from 
the tables, his constitutional rights have been violated. I do 
not subscribe to that theory. No one should, least of all the 
Justices of the Supreme Court.
135
 
The other dissenters did not join in this part of his opinion, but 
Justice Scalia’s point was clear: the Constitution guarantees the right 
to a fair trial, and nothing that happens in the plea bargaining process 
undermines that right. 
In his solo dissent, Justice Alito focused on an evident weakness 
in the majority’s decision.
136
 The majority left implementation of the 
remedy to the trial court. Is it fair, after the prosecution goes to trial, 
to require it to vacate some of the convictions? How will courts 
decide what to do when, years after a conviction, there is an 
allegation that the defendant received ineffective assistance of 
counsel during the plea bargaining process? It is well and good for 
the Court to say that it leaves the issue to the discretion of the trial 
court, Justice Alito reasoned, but there is very little guidance about 
how judges should exercise that discretion.
137
 
 
 133. Id. at 1397. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1398. 
 136. Id. at 1398–99 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. at 1391. 
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IV.  AFTERMATH OF FRYE AND LAFLER: 
WHAT DO WE DO NOW? 
How are Frye and Lafler likely to change the actions of defense 
counsel, prosecutors and the courts? The Supreme Court’s decisions 
in these cases are likely to have a significant practical impact on plea 
bargaining practices across the nation. 
A.  Defense Counsel’s Responsibilities 
First, defense lawyers must do what they should have been 
doing all along; they need to talk to their clients and give them 
accurate advice.
138
 This may sound easy, but in the quick-moving, 
rough-and-tumble world of plea bargaining, it is not always easy for 
counsel to have in-depth discussions about all of the prosecution’s 
offers. Often, their clients cannot be reached by simply picking up 
the phone. Defense lawyers must go through elaborate processes to 
visit clients in jail and, even then, the conditions are less than 
optimum for having full conferences regarding plea offers. 
As one district judge noted after Frye and Lafler were decided, 
nothing about these decisions will magically make defense counsel 
into competent lawyers.
139
 In fact, the decisions have the potential to 
backfire by pushing defense attorneys to urge their clients to take the 
first plea offered, even if defense counsel’s experience and 
assessment of the case leads counsel to believe that there might be a 
better deal down the road.
140
 Certainly, defense counsel should 
communicate all plea offers to defendants,
141
 but plea bargaining 
standards cannot go so far as to second-guess counsel’s “best advice” 
to defendants not to accept the earliest offer. 
 
 138. Even the question of what constitutes “accurate” information can be a challenging one. 
Certainly, defense counsel should be willing to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the 
defendant’s case. However, there are subtleties in the negotiation process, such as defense 
counsel’s assessment of the prosecution’s case and observations about the judgment, personality, 
and skills of the prosecutor. Frye and Lafler do not attempt to define whether defense counsel 
must disclose this type of information to a client when advising the client whether to accept a plea 
offer. 
 139. Rakoff, supra note 22, at 26. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Defense counsel has an ethical duty to: (a) “keep the accused advised of developments 
arising out of plea discussions conducted with the prosecutor” and (b) “promptly communicate 
and explain to the accused all significant plea proposals by the prosecutor.” See STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEA DISCUSSIONS § 4-6.2 (1993). 
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If anything, Frye and Lafler should compel defense counsel to 
investigate a case at an earlier stage because there may be time 
pressure when advising a defendant whether to accept a plea 
bargain.
142
 Other decisions by the Supreme Court, including United 
States v. Ruiz,
143
 make it difficult for defense counsel to obtain the 
information to properly advise a defendant. Thus, defense counsel 
must honestly say when they do not have sufficient information to 
properly advise the client about accepting a plea. Additionally, some 
defense lawyers have the added challenge of advising juveniles or 
defendants with mental impairments. Quick decisions must often be 
made regarding courses of actions that can have a long-term impact 
on a defendant, even if the defendant can avoid a custodial 
sentence.
144
 
Second, defense counsel must keep clear records of not only the 
offers prosecutors present but also their expiration dates, how likely 
they are to be withdrawn, how and when they were presented to the 
client, and any changes to them over time. Of course, many lawyers 
already do this,
145
 but the Supreme Court’s decisions will make the 
lawyer’s recordkeeping key evidence in any post-plea or posttrial 
hearings. However, there must also be flexibility in this system to 
accommodate the current practice of allowing defense lawyers to 
obtain in advance from a client the authority to reject certain classes 
of plea offers. A procedure that requires defense counsel to convey 
every offer—even if it is within a category of offers already rejected  
 
 
 142. See id. § 4-6.1(b) (“Defense counsel may engage in plea discussions with the prosecutor. 
Under no circumstances should defense counsel recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea 
unless appropriate investigation and study of the case has been completed, including an analysis 
of controlling law and the evidence likely to be introduced at trial.”) (emphasis added). 
 143. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). In Ruiz, the defendant was offered a “fast 
track” plea bargain that required him to agree to a guilty plea even without receiving any 
impeachment information regarding the government’s witnesses. Id. at 625. The Supreme Court 
held that there was no constitutional right to impeachment information before a guilty plea. Id. at 
629. Imposing a disclosure rule on the government would undermine the efficiency benefits of 
plea-bargaining and is not required by due process. Id. at 630. 
 144. See Allison D. Redlich, The Susceptibility of Juveniles to False Confessions and False 
Guilty Pleas, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 943, 952 (2010) (discussing susceptibility of juveniles to false 
guilty pleas); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the 
Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 297–303 (2011) (discussing the major 
collateral consequences of minor criminal convictions). 
 145. Sandi Johnson, Applying the Standards of Professionalism and Civility to the Practice of 
Criminal Law, UTAH BAR J., Nov.–Dec. 2005, at 30–31 (explaining that standard practice is to 
put plea agreements in writing). 
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by the defendant—is likely to pose additional obstacles to the plea 
bargaining process. 
Third, defense counsel should probably give every indication to 
the prosecution that a defendant is likely to accept an offer, even if 
defense counsel is unsure, so that the record remains strong for 
subsequent proceedings. Therefore, it might be more difficult for 
defense counsel to be as candid with prosecutors as to the likelihood 
of a defendant accepting a plea because telling a prosecutor straight 
out that a defendant does not seem so inclined may later hurt a 
defendant’s chances at postconviction relief. Defense counsel should 
not, however, fall into the trap of pushing a defendant toward 
accepting a plea just to avoid later claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in the plea bargaining process. 
Finally, defense counsel must consider every plea bargain to be 
as important as a trial. This is not necessarily a bad thing. Certainly, 
for a defendant pleading guilty, he or she would expect such a 
commitment by defense counsel. Yet, for defense lawyers, pleas 
have long taken a back seat to trial preparation.
146
 Given the Court’s 
decisions, this can no longer be the case. 
B.  Prosecutor’s Responsibilities 
Prosecutors will also find themselves with new responsibilities 
after Frye and Lafler. Before discussing prosecutors’ responsibilities 
to ensure that plea bargains are made after effective assistance of 
counsel, it is important to consider what prosecutors’ overall 
responsibilities should be in order to ensure that a climate of fear 
does not create a caseload crisis that will be used to justify a coercive 
plea bargaining system. 
1.  Taming Overcharging 
The American prosecutor is sometimes referred to as a “Minister 
of Justice.”
147
 “While the criminal defense attorney’s role in 
promoting the administration of justice is through the loyal and 
zealous representation of the accused, the prosecutor has a broader 
 
 146. Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assistance and Client-Centered 
Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 852 (1998). 
 147. Jonathan A. Rapping, Who’s Guarding the Henhouse? How the American Prosecutor 
Came to Devour Those He Is Sworn to Protect, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 513, 519 (2012). 
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obligation to ensure that justice is done.”
148
 The concept of “justice” 
is nebulous at best, but it has been traditionally tied to procedural 
protections that ensure the defendant has a fair opportunity to defend 
himself against the state’s accusations.
149
 
Yet, prosecutors have the power to charge so many cases that 
the traditional tools to protect a defendant’s rights and achieve 
“justice” are stretched beyond their limits. An explosion in state and 
federal criminal laws has given prosecutors the power to 
dramatically increase both the number of individuals charged and the 
number of charges each defendant faces.
150
 Moreover, the climate of 
fear in America increases pressure on prosecutors to be more 
aggressive in their charging.
151
 
From the beginning, prosecutors have controlled plea bargaining 
because they control the number of cases defense counsel will have 
to handle and how likely the defense will be able to mount a defense 
against increasingly tougher charges. While the Supreme Court’s 
focus in Frye and Lafler is on the failings of defense lawyers to 
properly investigate their cases and advise their clients, certainly 
some of the responsibility for creating an environment where this is 
likely to happen falls on prosecutors.
152
 By using all of the firepower 
they have available and stretching the resources of the defense bar, 
prosecutors can create an atmosphere where plea bargaining becomes 
mechanical and defense lawyers sacrifice individualized, zealous 
attention to cases. Thus, the first step in ensuring a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights are protected in plea bargaining is for prosecutors 
to take a hard look at their charging decisions. It must become part of 
 
 148. Id. at 519–20; see also Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined 
Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 555 (1999). 
 149. See Bruce Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
607, 608 (1999) (“In the trial context [‘doing justice’] . . . had something to do with fidelity to the 
fairness of the process—the idea that, if the trial was a fair one, then even when the jury acquitted 
a defendant whom we were convinced was guilty, justice was done.”). 
 150. See generally Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 
(2005) (detailing the increase in number of crimes and harsher punishments during recent 
decades). 
 151. Rapping, supra note 147, at 569 (“Across the country prosecutors charge far more cases 
than the system is resourced to handle and use their power in the plea bargaining arena to coerce 
the accused into forgoing fundamental rights designed to ensure just outcomes.”). 
 152. Rakoff, supra note 22, at 26 (“In reality, . . . most of the unfairness that occurs during the 
plea-bargaining process is . . . not the result of defense counsel’s ineffectiveness. Instead, it is the 
result of overconfidence on the part of prosecutors, whose evidence and sources, having never 
been put to the test of a trial, appear much stronger to the prosecutors than is objectively 
warranted.”). 
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the prosecutorial culture to consider how charging decisions will 
affect defense counsel’s ability to properly advise a defendant during 
the plea bargaining process.
153
 
2.  Safeguarding the Plea Bargaining Process 
In order to ensure that a defendant will not be able to reverse his 
conviction years down the line, prosecutors should document all plea 
offers, their expiration dates, and whether they are binding on the 
court. Then the prudent prosecutor may ask for written confirmation 
that the offer has been shared with the client. Undoubtedly, 
prosecutorial offices will start developing signed notice forms that 
can be used to document plea offers. 
Prosecutors should also ask the court to put on the record, before 
a trial, whether there were any plea offers and, if so, that the 
defendant rejected the offers. This is complicated by the policy in 
federal court that judges should not be involved in plea bargaining.
154
 
One must be concerned how even this effort might subtly involve the 
judge in plea discussions. Thus, it may be necessary to have the 
defendant verify that a plea offer was made, but have the written 
terms of that plea offer lodged with the court under seal. 
Prosecutors might also find themselves in the awkward position 
of having the court inquire whether defense counsel has not only 
shared a plea offer, but also adequately answered the defendant’s 
questions regarding the process and applicable law that would affect 
the defendant’s decision whether to accept the offer. It is 
questionable how candid such colloquies will be. For example, given 
that many plea agreements are arranged to avoid collateral 
consequences to the defendant and his family, such as the loss of 
custody of a child, judges may become far more immersed in the 
plea bargaining process than the Supreme Court anticipated. 
The plea bargaining process, which is intended to make the 
criminal justice system more expeditious, may need to be slowed 
down to accommodate the new procedures that will ensure effective 
assistance of counsel during plea bargaining. It is reckless for 
prosecutors to push for plea bargains before they have had a full 
opportunity to evaluate a case. Standards for discovery and 
 
 153. Rapping, supra note 147, at 569. 
 154. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). 
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communications of plea bargains need to be established that will 
ensure that the bargains offered actually reflect the merits of the case. 
C.  Judge’s Responsibilities 
Ultimately, the responsibility will fall on judges to ensure that 
defense counsel adequately participates in the plea bargaining 
process. This is true regardless of whether the case ends in a guilty 
plea or with a trial. A prudent judge will now ask the parties and 
counsel whether there were any plea offers and if their terms were 
communicated to the defendant. Moreover, that judge may also ask 
counsel to put on the record, in camera or in open court, why a 
defendant is declining a plea offer. 
The judge must take these steps without coercing a defendant 
into accepting or rejecting a plea, and without interfering with the 
attorney–client relationship. Defense counsel may be privy to 
additional information demonstrating why a defendant should not 
accept the deal, but the court is not necessarily entitled to have all of 
this information. Judges must also resist the temptation to second 
guess defense counsel’s strategy in counseling a client to reject a 
plea offer. Strickland requires that great deference be afforded to the 
decisions of defense counsel. While the court may view a plea offer 
as too good to refuse, defense counsel may have strategic reasons to 
suggest that a defendant reject a specific plea offer. 
The biggest challenge for the court will be to maintain its role as 
an impartial decision maker and avoid being drawn into the actual 
plea negotiations. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11(c)(1), “[t]he court must not participate in [plea agreement] 
discussions.”
155
 In order to preserve the court’s impartiality and not 
put undue pressure on a defendant to accept a plea deal, the Rules 
specifically prohibit judges from participating in plea bargaining.
156
 
Courts must now walk the fine line between documenting plea offers 
and unnecessary and unwarranted intrusion into the plea bargaining 
process. The more the court is charged with keeping track of the plea 
bargaining process, the more likely the judge will step into an 
active—even unintentionally coercive role—in plea negotiations. 
 
 155. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). 
 156. See United States v. Bradley, 455 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2006). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The lessons of Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper seem 
simple on their face—defense counsel must convey all plea offers to 
a client and then provide adequate advice as to whether to accept 
such offers. However, as the Supreme Court recognized in these 
recent decisions, this simple rule cannot always be easily enforced.
157
 
Plea bargaining is more of an art than a science; there is no one way 
to cut the perfect deal. 
While Frye and Lafler have drawn attention to how defense 
counsel performs during plea bargaining, the decisions raise greater 
concerns. As the Supreme Court has finally recognized, the criminal 
justice system is likely to continue to embrace a compromise system 
for criminal cases. Plea bargaining will be the rule, not the exception. 
The quality of case dispositions will depend, therefore, not just on 
how defense counsel performs, but also on the number and merit of 
cases brought by prosecutors. 
In order to ensure that plea bargaining works fairly and 
efficiently, efforts must be made to remedy the systemic pressures 
that have created plea bargaining abuses.
158
 Plea bargaining was born 
of necessity. Since its inception, it has been viewed as a means to 
process an increasingly higher volume of cases. The experiences of 
foreign countries have been the same. A simplified, faster procedure 
meets the number one pressure driving our current criminal justice 
system—there are too many cases. 
While there is no guarantee that a reduction in the number of 
cases will lead prosecutors and defense counsel to more carefully 
examine the resolution of individual cases,
159
 reducing the number of 
cases would offer the opportunity to prosecutors, defense counsel, 
and judges to spend more time evaluating and investigating their 
cases. Reducing the volume of criminal cases is not an easy task. 
 
 157. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 158. Some jurisdictions have tried to deal with the problems with plea bargaining by 
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with mixed results. See Guidorizzi, Comment, supra note 60, at 773–77 (noting that Alaska’s ban 
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plea bargaining does not deal with the underlying problem that there are too many cases for the 
criminal justice system to fully adjudicate. 
 159. See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal 
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 117–21 (2005) (noting that guilty plea and acquittal rates do not 
necessarily correlate to increase in criminal caseloads). 
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Substantial efforts are in progress, from changing charging 
guidelines to reevaluating parole revocation procedures.
160
 These 
systemic changes—as well as even bolder initiatives, such as 
criminal mediation
161
—may disrupt the current syndrome of 
assembly-line guilty pleas. 
As the Supreme Court acknowledged, the plea bargaining 
process is here to stay. Defense lawyers have a Sixth Amendment 
duty to professionally advise their clients regarding such 
negotiations, but everyone in the criminal justice system, including 
the prosecutor and judge, has a role to play in ensuring that a 
defendant’s constitutional rights are protected. To do this, we must 
now keep track of what pleas are being made and whether the 
defendant has been adequately counseled about the advisability of 
the plea deal. We must also be keenly aware of the impact that the 
volume of cases has on a defense lawyer’s ability to do her job. The 
plea bargaining process may sometimes be distasteful and a 
nuisance, but it is also a reality. After Frye and Lafler, it comes with 
plenty of strings attached. 
 
 
 160. See, e.g., California Realignment Act, ch. 15 (2011). 
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